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HOW LONG IS TOO LONG?:
CONFLICTING STATE RESPONSES
TO DE FACTO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
SENTENCES AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
AND MILLER V. ALABAMA
Kelly Scavone*
A juvenile offender waits for sentencing while a court calculates his life
expectancy and determines the point at which his sentence effectively
becomes his entire life. This is the scenario posed by recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that have struck down life without parole (LWOP)
sentences for most juvenile offenders but have left open the possibility of
lengthy term-of-years sentences. Consecutive term-of-years sentences may
leave many juvenile offenders in prison for the majority of their lives
despite the holdings in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida that
juveniles are different and more capable of reform than most adult
offenders.
This Note examines the issues created by long term-of-years sentences or
“virtual LWOP” after Miller and Graham. Specifically, this Note
addresses the (1) unconstitutionality of virtual LWOP sentences under
Graham; and (2) inconsistencies created between sentences given to
homicide and nonhomicide juvenile offenders after Miller. Ultimately, this
Note analyzes statutory responses to juvenile LWOP sentences and
proposes that either parole restrictions for juveniles must be removed
entirely or comprehensive statutory schemes must be enacted to provide
multiple opportunities for release.
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INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment.1 In recent years, courts have become increasingly
concerned with the Eighth Amendment in the context of juvenile
sentencing. These concerns culminated in a series of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that questioned the validity of imposing the highest forms of
punishment on juvenile offenders.2
In 2010, the Supreme Court
categorically banned life without parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders
convicted of nonhomicide offenses.3 In 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller
v. Alabama struck down mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders.4 The Court found mandatory LWOP sentences to be an
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.5 Unlike in Miller’s
predecessor, Graham v. Florida,6 the Supreme Court in Miller did not
impose a categorical ban on LWOP sentences for nonhomicide juvenile
offenders.7 Instead, the Court left open the possibility that the worst
juvenile homicide offenders may be deserving of an LWOP sentence but
closed the door on any sentencing schemes that include a mandatory LWOP
sentence for juveniles.8
The narrow holding of Miller has left several residual questions
regarding the future of juvenile sentencing and how states should
incorporate both the Miller and Graham decisions into their sentencing
structure.9 Specifically, state courts have dealt with the question of lengthy
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
4. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58.
5. Id. at 2460.
6. 130 S. Ct. 2011.
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See Krisztina Schlessel, Note, Graham’s Applicability to Term-of-Years Sentences
and Mandate To Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity” for Release, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
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term-of-years sentences given to both nonhomicide and homicide juveniles
that are essentially synonymous with LWOP sentences, given the young age
of the offenders.10 These lengthy term-of-years sentences constitute virtual
or de facto LWOP sentences that may pose the same constitutional
questions for juveniles as mandatory LWOP sentences.11
Responses in state courts to the issue of virtual LWOP sentences after
Miller and Graham have varied significantly.12 Some state courts,
including those of California and Iowa, have held that based on the distinct
characteristics of juvenile offenders that result in diminished culpability,
Miller and Graham must apply equally to both LWOP and virtual LWOP
sentences given to juvenile homicide offenders.13 These courts have
focused on the spirit of both Miller and Graham, which insists on a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for all juvenile offenders.14
However, other state courts, including those of Florida and Louisiana,
have adopted a different reading of Miller and Graham.15 These states,
examining virtual LWOP sentences of nonhomicide offenders, have upheld
lengthy sentences that amount to the equivalent of LWOP sentences.16
State courts in Florida and Louisiana have applied only the holding of
Graham and have held that virtual LWOP sentences do not fall under the
ban against LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.17 This
has resulted in a scenario where a court might strike down mandatory
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders but uphold virtual LWOP
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.18 This dichotomy has
resulted in punishments that are seemingly disproportionate with not only
the age of the offenders but also with the crimes that they have committed.
In light of the Supreme Court decisions that have held LWOP sentences to
be disproportionate punishment for the vast majority of juvenile offenders,
sentences that keep juveniles in prison for the majority or entirety of their
lives seem disproportionate with the diminished culpability of youths.
Several states have reformed their sentencing statutes to comply with
Miller and Graham.19 States including California and Wyoming have
removed parole restrictions on sentences given to all juvenile offenders,
1027, 1037–38 (2013) (“The first issue is whether Graham applies to a lengthy term-ofyears-without-parole sentence . . . . The second issue Graham leaves unresolved concerns
the manner in which states can achieve compliance with its holding.”). In addition to the
question of how Miller and Graham should impact term-of-years sentences, many states
have grappled with whether the Miller decision should be applied retroactively. See Marsha
L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson: Obtaining
Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 374–75 (2013).
10. See, e.g., People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012); State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d
332 (La. 2013).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part III.
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regardless of the offense committed.20 Juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP or life imprisonment become eligible for parole after a certain
number of years behind bars.21 The time served ranges from fifteen years
in California, after which the offender may petition a sentencing court for
recall and resentencing, to thirty-five years in Louisiana for juvenile
homicide offenders.22 Although these sentencing schemes comport with
Miller’s holding and offer juveniles originally sentenced to LWOP an
opportunity to demonstrate parole eligibility, these statutes only apply to
LWOP or life sentences and do not take lengthy term-of-years sentences
into account.23 Juvenile offenders are only considered under these statutes
if they have specifically been sentenced to LWOP or life imprisonment, as
indicated in the legislation.24 Any mandatory sentencing scheme that
results in virtual LWOP sentences without parole eligibility does not fall
under these statutes.
An adequate response to the issue of virtual LWOP sentences may lie in
sentencing reform similar to a juvenile sentencing statute in Montana. The
Montana statute,25 although enacted before both Graham and Miller, could
potentially address both LWOP and virtual LWOP sentences.26 In
Montana, any offenders who were convicted of a crime committed before
the age of eighteen are exempted from both LWOP sentences and sentences
with restrictions on parole eligibility.27 These exemptions apply to all
juvenile offenders regardless of the nature of the offense committed.28 This
ensures that juveniles are given an opportunity for release before spending
lengthy sentences in prison that result in either geriatric release or no
release at all.29
California has enacted comprehensive statutory reform, both in response
to Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP sentences and to virtual LWOP
sentences.30 The California state legislature recently passed statutory
revisions that will enable juvenile offenders, both homicide and
nonhomicide, to petition for parole after serving between fifteen and
twenty-five years of a lengthy term-of-years sentence.31 This statutory
scheme uses the same rationale as legislative reform for LWOP offenders in
Louisiana and Wyoming and applies it to virtual LWOP sentences. Both
the California and Montana statutes pose possible solutions to the issue of
virtual LWOP sentences after Graham and Miller.

20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:574.4(D) (2013).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (West Supp. 2013).
26. See infra Part III.B.1.
27. See infra Part III.B.1.
28. See MONT. CODE ANN § 46-18-222.
29. See infra Part III.B.1.
30. See infra Part III.B.2.
31. See infra Part III.B.2.
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This Note discusses the “children are different”32 rationale behind Miller
through which the various state responses can be analyzed. Ultimately, this
Note proposes that lengthy term-of-years sentences be viewed through the
same lens as LWOP sentences primarily due to the emphasis in Miller on
the need for individualized sentencing in juvenile cases, which considers
the mitigating characteristics of youth. Although virtual LWOP sentences
are not categorically barred for juvenile homicide offenders under Miller,
lengthy sentences without parole eligibility create the exact result that the
Court was trying to avoid in Miller and Graham. Juveniles must be
afforded individualized sentencing that accounts for the mitigating factors
of youth and, in the majority of cases, must be given an opportunity to
reenter society before spending their entire lives behind bars.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of juvenile sentencing under
the Eighth Amendment, culminating in the Miller decision in 2012. Part II
addresses responses to Graham and Miller in state courts and the
inconsistencies in juvenile sentencing that Miller created. Part III discusses
statutory responses to Graham and Miller and how the majority of
legislative approaches to juvenile offenders are inadequate. Finally, this
Note proposes that state legislatures develop a more streamlined response to
the issue of juvenile parole such as those seen in Montana and California.33
State courts and legislatures must implement the rationale behind Miller
and its predecessors in order to ensure that juveniles obtain the opportunity
for release during their lifetimes.34
I. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE SENTENCING
AND LWOP UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
This Part provides an overview of recent juvenile sentencing cases in the
Supreme Court and the rationale that led the Court to strike down
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders in Miller. Part
I.A gives a brief overview of the Eighth Amendment and how courts
analyze it with regard to cruel and unusual punishment. Part I.B discusses
Roper v. Simmons35 and Graham, the two cases leading up to Miller. These
two cases established the “juveniles are different” framework that guided
the majority decision in Miller. Part I.C provides an in-depth look at the
Miller decision and how the holding poses potential problems in application
in both state courts and legislatures.

32. See generally Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap
Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 92 (2013) (urging
courts to adhere to the rationale that youth is a mitigating factor in juvenile sentencing
practices).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part III.
35. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

2014]

DE FACTO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES

3445

A. The Eighth Amendment Bars Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”36 This constitutional protection guarantees “the
right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”37 The Eighth Amendment
stems from the concept that punishment must be “graduated” and
“proportioned” to the offense so as to accomplish justice.38 Recently, the
Supreme Court has adopted a more narrow proportionality principle.39 To
violate the Eighth Amendment, a particular sentence must be “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime committed.40 If the sentence appears to be
grossly disproportionate on its face, a court may consider sentences that
other offenders in the same jurisdiction received for similar crimes, as well
as sentences given in other jurisdictions.41
If the sentence is
disproportionate in comparison, the court may find that the sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.42
In addition, an analysis of punishment under the Eighth Amendment
considers whether the sanction is proportional to the offender.43
Specifically, the Supreme Court has been concerned with “mismatches
between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a
penalty.”44 Recently, this consideration has led the Supreme Court to
categorically ban certain types of punishment for specific groups of
offenders.45 Specifically, the Supreme Court found capital punishment
unconstitutional for mentally retarded and juvenile offenders based on the
lack of sufficient culpability in both groups.46
Another crucial consideration under the Eighth Amendment is the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”47 The Supreme Court considers societal opinions reflected in
objective criteria48 as to whether a particular punishment is outdated or

36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
38. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). Although the
proportionality analysis remains crucial to considerations of punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, scholars have noted that the concept of proportionality is entirely dependent on
the different justifications for punishment. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing
Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997) (arguing that an analysis of disparities in
sentences must consider the justifications for punishment).
39. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
40. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991)).
41. Id. at 2022.
42. Id.
43. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
44. Id.
45. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding capital punishment
for juvenile offenders unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(categorically banning capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders).
46. See infra Part I.B.2.
47. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
48. This criteria includes state legislation and any patterns or changes in societal
standards. See id. at 2470.
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rejected by the majority of state legislatures.49 The Supreme Court also
looks to national consensus, most often tallying up state laws to garner the
level of support, or lack thereof, for the considered punishment.50 In
addition, reviewing courts look beyond enacted legislation and examine the
practice of imposing the punishment and to what extent society has been
willing to carry out that punishment.51
Societal consensus and
proportionality are the key concerns for courts in the analysis of sentencing
under the Eighth Amendment.
B. Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida Consider Juvenile Culpability
and Potential for Reform
Part I.B gives a background for the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.
Part I.B.1 explains the two lines of precedent regarding the Eighth
Amendment that converged with Graham and later Miller. Part I.B.2
explains the holding in Roper, a landmark case that paved the way for the
Court in Graham. Part I.B.3 discusses Graham, the case immediately
preceding Miller in which the Supreme Court created the “juveniles are
different” rationale that ultimately framed its decision to strike down
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.
1. Two Lines of Precedent Converge When the Supreme Court Is
Confronted with Severe Forms of Punishment for Juvenile Offenders
The Graham and Miller decisions represent the convergence of two lines
of precedent in Supreme Court sentencing cases. The first line of precedent
struck down sentencing practices that resulted in overly harsh sentences
despite the diminished culpability of the offenders.52 These cases adopted a
policy of individualized sentencing by “consider[ing] all of the
circumstances of the case to determine whether the sentence is
unconstitutionally excessive.”53 Under this analysis, the concept of
proportionality became key as the Court “compar[ed] the gravity of the
offense and the severity of the sentence.”54
The second line of cases used categorical rules to analyze punishment
under the Eighth Amendment based on the nature of either the offender or
the offense.55 This string of precedent struck down death penalty sentences
for the least culpable offenders, namely juveniles and those “whose
intellectual functioning is in a low range.”56

49. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).
50. Id. (“[T]he ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312)).
51. Id. (noting that although juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenders was a legal
sentence in a majority of states, the practice of imposing that sentence was highly rare).
52. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.
53. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
54. Id. at 2022.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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The two lines of precedent met when the Supreme Court was faced with
the issues surrounding life imprisonment for juvenile offenders.57 The
cases immediately preceding Miller analogized LWOP sentences to the
death penalty for juvenile offenders.58 Thus, the need for individualized
sentencing in death penalty cases and the emphasis on “consider[ing] the
‘mitigating qualities of youth’” led the Miller Court to strike down
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.59 These two categories
of cases converged with regards to the sentencing of juvenile offenders
“because of their lesser culpability.”60 Two landmark cases, Roper and
Graham, established the framework for considering LWOP sentences for
juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment and paved the way for the
Miller decision.
2. Juveniles Are Different: The Supreme Court Strikes Down the Death
Penalty for Juvenile Offenders in Roper v. Simmons
In 2005, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of death
penalty sentences for juvenile offenders in Roper.61 The Court previously
faced this issue in Stanford v. Kentucky62 and held that capital punishment
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.63 Roper overturned the Stanford
decision and created a categorical ban on capital punishment for juvenile
offenders under the age of eighteen.64 The Court held that the death penalty
was disproportionate punishment for juveniles and thus constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.65
The Court noted, “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”66
Roper established the principle that due to their lesser culpability, juveniles
must be treated differently for sentencing purposes.67 The Court outlined
three general distinctions between juveniles and adults that placed juvenile
offenders squarely outside the boundaries of those exceptional offenders
deserving the death penalty.68

57. See id. at 2021–23.
58. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
59. Id. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
60. Id. at 2463.
61. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
62. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
63. Id. at 380.
64. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79; see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2038
(2010) (“More recently, in Roper . . . we extended the prohibition on executions to those
who committed their crimes before the age of 18.”).
65. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
66. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
67. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“Roper established that because juveniles have lessened
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”).
68. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
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First, juveniles are decidedly immature and irresponsible.69 As a result,
adolescents as a whole are more inclined toward reckless behavior and rash
decisions.70 This reality is reflected in society’s laws that prohibit juvenile
participation in certain adult activities.71 Thus, juvenile conduct is not as
“morally reprehensible” as that of an adult and cannot be punished in the
same manner.72
This immaturity played a significant role in the Court’s second
distinction about juveniles as a class of offenders.73 The Roper decision
highlighted that juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures.”74 The Court equated this vulnerability
with a lack of control over one’s surroundings and thus an inability to resist
potentially criminal influences.75 Culpability is diminished if one’s
decisions are more likely to be outside the control of the offender.76
The third characteristic of juveniles that the Court discussed is the
underdeveloped character of a juvenile as compared to an adult.77 This
transient character of juveniles indicates that the recklessness and
susceptibility evident in the first two characteristics are subject to change.78
In this regard, Roper emphasized the greater possibility for reform in
juvenile offenders.79
When viewed as a whole, these three character traits evident in juveniles
create the presumption that juvenile offenders can never be among those
most deserving of capital punishment.80 Although the Court noted that
drawing categorical lines always poses difficulties, society’s decision to
create its own categorical distinctions at the age of eighteen indicates that a
line can be drawn with regard to capital punishment.81
69. Id. at 569.
70. See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence:
A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 341 (1992) (noting that the “sensation seeking”
and “egocentrism” associated with adolescence as a developmental phase lead to
recklessness); see also Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality,
and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW &
INEQ. 263, 284 (2013) (“To assess risks, a person has to be able to identify potential
outcomes, estimate their likelihood of occurring, and make valuations of possible
consequences. Adolescents underestimate the amount and likelihood of risks, emphasize
immediate outcomes, and focus on gains rather than losses to a greater extent than do
adults.”).
71. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“In recognition of the comparative immaturity and
irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from
voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”).
72. Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
73. Id. at 569.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 570.
76. Id. at 569–70.
77. Id. at 570.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 572–73 (“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked
and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability.”).
81. Id. at 574.
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As stated above, analysis of punishment under the Eighth Amendment
includes an assessment of “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”82 Accordingly, a major factor in the Roper
decision was an evolution in the states with regard to capital punishment for
juvenile offenders since the Stanford decision.83 The Court compared this
change to the evolution of state laws concerning the death penalty for the
mentally retarded.84 On the same day that the Stanford decision came
down, the Supreme Court held in Perry v. Lynaugh85 that capital
punishment for mentally retarded offenders did not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.86 When the Court
reconsidered this issue in Atkins v. Virginia,87 the evolving standards of
decency, measured by changes in state practices, led the Court to hold that
death penalty sentences for the mentally retarded did, in fact, constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.88
Similarly, the Roper Court looked to changing attitudes toward juvenile
offenders and the death penalty through “objective indicia,” including state
laws and common practices.89 Although less dramatic than the societal
shift seen with capital punishment for the mentally retarded, the Court
noted that the direction of state practices and laws indicated a consistent
shift away from executing juvenile offenders.90
3. Applying Roper Outside of Capital Punishment:
The Supreme Court Holds LWOP for Juvenile Nonhomicide
Offenders Unconstitutional in Graham v. Florida
The framework established in Roper became the basis for the landmark
Graham decision to ban LWOP sentences for nonhomicide juvenile
offenders.91 The Graham Court first indicated that LWOP sentences are
analogous to capital punishment for juvenile offenders.92
Capital
punishment and LWOP share characteristics that are “shared by no other
sentences.”93 The Court noted that LWOP sentences are especially harsh
82. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
83. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565 (“Five States that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the
time of Stanford have abandoned it in the intervening 15 years—four through legislative
enactments and one through judicial decision.”).
84. Id. at 564–65.
85. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
86. See id. at 335.
87. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
88. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563.
89. Id. at 563–64.
90. Id. at 566 (“Since Stanford, no State that previously prohibited capital punishment
for juveniles has reinstated it. This fact, coupled with the trend toward abolition of the
juvenile death penalty, carries special force in light of the general popularity of anticrime
legislation.”).
91. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).
92. Id. at 2027 (“[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences . . . [both sentences alter] the offender’s life
by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”).
93. Id.
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for juvenile offenders when “a juvenile offender will on average serve more
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”94
Both the death penalty and LWOP constitute a denial of any hope of release
or restoration into society.95 Thus, the analysis of Graham proceeded to
evaluate LWOP sentences under a similar framework as previously used in
Roper.96
The Graham opinion went on to deny any penological justifications for
LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.97 Using the distinct
characteristics of juveniles outlined in Roper, the Court determined that
LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders is incompatible with effective
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.98 As the Court stated in
Graham, retribution is a theory of punishment that is based upon the idea
that “[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions on a[n] . . . offender to
express its condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral
imbalance caused by the offense.”99 Retribution is not an appropriate
justification when the sentence imposed is disproportional with the
culpability of the offender.100 As first articulated in Roper, “[r]etribution is
not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by
reason of youth and immaturity.”101 Moreover, Graham stated that the
justification for retribution was further diminished in cases where the
juvenile offenders were not convicted of homicide.102 Retribution therefore
does not justify LWOP sentences given the diminished culpability of
juveniles combined with the diminished culpability of nonhomicide
offenders.103
Turning to the deterrence justification, Graham noted that any deterrent
effect of LWOP sentences was insufficient given the immaturity of juvenile
offenders.104 Punishment is justified under the deterrence theory if
offenders are likely to consider the potential punishment prior to acting.105
The recklessness associated with juvenile behavior discussed in both Roper
and Graham indicates that “[juveniles] are less likely to take a possible
punishment into consideration when making decisions.”106
Thus,
deterrence has a diminished effect when dealing with juvenile offenders.107
94. Id. at 2028.
95. Id. at 2027.
96. Id. at 2027–28.
97. Id. at 2028.
98. Id. at 2028–29.
99. Id. at 2028.
100. Id. (“‘The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.’” (quoting Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987))).
101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
102. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2028–29.
107. Id. at 2029.
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The Court further noted that deterrence is even less likely when the
punishment in question is rarely imposed.108 Even assuming that there is a
minimal deterrent effect of LWOP on nonhomicide offenders, Graham held
that even limited deterrence is insufficient to justify LWOP based on the
gross disproportionality of the sentence.109
Finally, incapacitation does not form a satisfactory justification for
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.110 The theory of incapacitation
rests on the belief that criminals should be incarcerated to prevent future
crime.111 In the case of LWOP, incapacitation suggests that the “offender
forever will be a danger to society” and thus must be incarcerated
permanently.112 For a court to justify permanent incapacitation, there must
be some consensus that the offender is incorrigible and therefore must be
removed from society.113 However, the characteristics of youth indicate
that reform is more probable for juvenile offenders.114 In fact, the transient
qualities of juveniles make it nearly impossible for a court to determine at
the time of sentencing that the juvenile offender will pose a threat to society
for the entirety of his or her natural life.115 While incapacitation provides
some justification for sentencing juvenile offenders, the Court held that the
extent of incapacitation achieved with LWOP cannot be justified as applied
to juvenile nonhomicide offenders.116
The Court also noted that LWOP is impermissible for juvenile offenders
given their potential for rehabilitation.117 Thus, rehabilitation is not an
appropriate justification for imposing LWOP on juvenile offenders.118 In
imposing an LWOP sentence and removing the offender from the
community permanently, “the State makes an irrevocable judgment about
that person’s value and place in society.”119 This irreversible judgment is
not appropriate in light of the high probability for reform in juvenile
offenders.120 An additional concern with LWOP in the context of
rehabilitation is that “defendants serving life without parole sentences are
often denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services
that are available to other inmates.”121 The Court even goes so far as to say
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Mark T. Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the
Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 979 (2013) (“The
incapacitation theory of punishment suggests that a state should imprison some criminals so
that those individuals do not commit more crimes.”).
112. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the
juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questionable.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2030.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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that the lack of rehabilitative services available for LWOP inmates factors
into the proportionality of the sentence.122 The incompatibility of LWOP
and rehabilitation further adds to the Court’s determination that LWOP for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders is grossly disproportionate and thus cruel
and unusual punishment.123
Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justice Scalia and Justice Alito, wrote a
dissenting opinion in Graham.124 Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that the
Court should not make these moral judgments on juvenile sentencing when
“Congress, the District of Columbia, and 37 States allow judges and juries
to consider this sentencing practice in juvenile nonhomicide cases.”125
Justice Thomas argued that the majority highly overstates any evolution in
state courts and legislatures regarding LWOP sentencing.126 He noted that
state legislatures should ultimately decide the proportionality of an
offense.127 Despite the majority’s argument that only 123 juvenile
offenders were serving LWOP for nonhomicide offenses at the time of the
opinion, Justice Thomas stated that both objective societal indicia and the
evolving standards of decency indicated that public opinion supported the
possibility that some juvenile nonhomicide offenders should serve
LWOP.128 In addition to the large majority of states with LWOP sentences,
Justice Thomas’s dissent noted that “states over the past 20 years have
consistently increased the severity of punishments for juvenile
offenders.”129 In Justice Thomas’s view, the rare imposition of LWOP did
not negate the strong consensus among state legislatures that the sentence
should remain available to those juveniles most deserving of LWOP.130
Justice Alito, in his own dissenting opinion in Graham, briefly touched
on the issue of lengthy term-of-years sentences.131 Justice Alito noted that
the majority’s holding applied to LWOP sentences alone, stating, “Nothing
in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years
without the possibility of parole.”132 Justice Alito followed the rationale
that Graham’s narrow holding did not reach outside the strict LWOP
sentence despite rhetoric to the contrary in the Graham opinion—an
approach that was later employed by state courts faced with imposing
virtual LWOP sentences.133

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 2048–49.
127. Id. at 2045.
128. Id. at 2048–49.
129. Id. at 2050 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 2051.
131. Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (“Indeed, petitioner conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much as 40
years without the possibility of parole [likely] would be constitutional.”).
133. See infra Part II.
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C. Extending the “Juveniles Are Different” Framework to Homicide
Offenses: Miller v. Alabama
Part I.C.1 gives an overview of the Court’s rationale in Miller and how
Graham and Roper set the stage for the ultimate holding. Part I.C.2
discusses the two dissenting opinions in Miller that form important
counterarguments to the ban on mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide
offenders.
1. Miller Establishes the Rule That Mandatory LWOP and Juvenile
Offenders Are Largely Incompatible and Thus Disproportionate
Two years after the Graham decision banned LWOP sentences for
nonhomicide juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of LWOP sentences given to two juvenile offenders convicted of
homicide.134 Both offenders were fourteen at the time that they committed
the crime.135 In both instances, the sentencing court did not have any
discretion in imposing an LWOP sentence.136 Using the framework
established in Graham, the Court struck down mandatory LWOP sentences
for juvenile homicide offenders.137
Miller applied the concept articulated in Graham that “youth matters” in
juvenile sentencing when invoking the state’s harshest punishments.138 The
analysis in Miller was centered on the premise that “none of what [Graham]
said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits
and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”139
Thus, the
Supreme Court saw no distinction in the lesser culpability of juveniles
between nonhomicide and homicide offenses for the purposes of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.140
The Miller decision
emphasized the need for discretion in juvenile cases, regardless of the crime
committed.141
The Miller decision did not create a categorical ban on LWOP sentences
for juvenile homicide offenders.142 Instead, the Court was more concerned
with the absence of any discretionary tactics available in mandatory
sentencing schemes.143 “Such mandatory penalties, by their nature,
preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the
wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”144 The Court
noted that the lack of individualized considerations in mandatory sentencing
134. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2465.
139. Id.
140. Id. (“So Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on
a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”).
141. Id. at 2466. (“[I]mposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children.”).
142. Id. at 2469.
143. Id. at 2467.
144. Id.
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schemes for juveniles did not satisfy the proportionality test under the
Eighth Amendment,145 stating:
By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime
incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and agerelated characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory
sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and
so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 146

Although the Court’s opinion focused on LWOP sentences in this regard,
the analysis of mandatory sentences seemed to indicate that individualized
sentencing that incorporates the mitigating factors of youth must always be
used when considering harsh or lengthy sentences for juvenile offenders.147
The Court further predicted that LWOP sentences for juveniles would
become uncommon once courts were required to use discretion.148
The Supreme Court considered arguments from Alabama and Arkansas
that mandatory sentencing schemes had been upheld in the past under the
Eighth Amendment and thus should not be struck down as cruel and
unusual.149 The majority rejected this argument, distinguishing Miller from
past mandatory sentencing cases.150 The Court was faced specifically with
mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders.151 It noted, “We have by now
held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may
not be so for children.”152 This reiterates the rationale that children are
different from adults in the sentencing context and indicates that any
mandatory sentencing scheme for “society’s harshest punishments” cannot
be imposed on juvenile offenders.153
The Court’s views on the lack of proportionality between juvenile
offenders and LWOP may be reflected in the nature of offenders that are
145. Id.; see also Feld, supra note 70, at 327 (“Moreover, proportionality is a retributive
concept, not a utilitarian one, and the Court decided Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson
firmly on retributive grounds—reduced culpability—even after examining the relevant
utilitarian justifications for punishment. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to disregard
the categorical mitigating role of youthfulness at sentencing to incapacitate some youths who
may be deemed to be life-course persistent offenders.”).
146. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
147. Id. (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must
have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest
possible penalty for juveniles.”).
148. Id. at 2469; see also Aryn Seiler, Buried Alive: The Constitutional Question of Life
Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Convicted of Homicide, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
293, 319–20 (2013) (“It is unclear why the Court refused to extend Graham’s categorical
rule to all juvenile offenders because the Court offered no expanded explanation. The Court
merely stated that it anticipated the sentence would be uncommon once courts and juries
were required to consider age as a mitigating factor.”).
149. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. Alabama and Arkansas cited Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that a sentence was not unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment simply because it was mandatory. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
The States argued that striking down mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders would
effectively overrule Harmelin. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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sentenced to LWOP.154 “A review of juvenile life without parole cases
contradicts the general assumption that these sentences are reserved only for
the most chronically violent youth.”155 In fact, many juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP were first-time offenders at the time of conviction.156
However, the mandatory nature of state sentencing laws does not give
judges any discretion to consider these factors, as seen in a major portion of
the Court’s analysis in Miller.157
2. Dissenting Opinions in Miller Challenge
the Validity of the Majority’s Holding
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the majority
had ignored objective societal indicia that state courts and legislatures
approved mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.158
Under the Eighth Amendment analysis, a court must consider “‘objective
indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and
state practice.’”159 The dissent emphasized the distinction between LWOP
for juvenile homicide offenders and the sentences considered in the past
under the Miller line of precedent.160 Specifically, the dissent focused on
the subject of Graham:
LWOP sentences given to nonhomicide
offenders.161 In Graham, the Court noted that although thirty-seven states,
the District of Columbia, and the federal government authorized LWOP for
nonhomicide juvenile offenders,162 the sentence was in fact incredibly
rare.163 Chief Justice Roberts noted that, at the time of the Miller opinion,
there were “nearly” 2,500 offenders serving LWOP for homicide offenses
committed as juveniles, and 2,000 of these offenders received these
sentences because they were legislatively mandated.164 Thus, the dissent
argued that mandatory LWOP sentences are far from unusual but, to the
contrary, are embraced by more than half of state legislatures.165
The Miller majority responded to this argument by noting that many
states did not have specific provisions for juvenile mandatory LWOP

154. See generally ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF
LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/publications/inc_NoExitSept2009.pdf.
155. Id. at 31.
156. Id. (“This fact runs contrary to the commonly-held assumption that individuals
serving LWOP sentences are chronic, repeat offenders.”).
157. Id.
158. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2477–78 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
163. Id. at 2026. “The Court explained that only 123 prisoners in the entire Nation were
serving life without parole for nonhomicide crimes committed as juveniles.” Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2478.
164. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477.
165. Id. at 2478 (noting that mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders was a
practice in twenty-nine states).
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sentences.166 Many jurisdictions implicitly authorized juvenile LWOP
through two separate statutory provisions, “often in . . . far-removed part[s]
of the code”167—juvenile transfer to adult court and mandatory LWOP for
homicide offenses.168 Depending on the offense committed, juvenile
offenders may be transferred to adult court where they are then subject to
the penalties and sentences given to adult offenders.169 The Court stated
that although this “confluence” of state legislation created mandatory
juvenile LWOP in twenty-nine states, it did not reflect that the sentence was
in fact supported by full legislative consideration and deliberation.170 In
light of the Court’s recent precedent regarding juvenile sentencing, the
Court did not regard the existence of mandatory LWOP in twenty-nine
states as indicating that societal standards pointed toward an acceptance of
the harsh sentence, even for juvenile homicide offenders.171
Furthermore, the Court noted that because Miller did not create a
categorical ban on LWOP sentences, instead striking down any mandatory
schemes that prevented the consideration of mitigating factors, any
“tall[ying of] legislative enactments” was far less compelling.172 The Court
did not foreclose the possibility that societal standards may point in favor of
lifetime incarceration for the worst juvenile homicide offenders.173 The
majority instead argued that there is no indication that state legislatures
have expressly condoned LWOP sentences for juveniles without
considering the mitigating qualities of youth and the nature of the offenses
committed.174
II. MILLER AND GRAHAM CREATE CONFLICTING RESPONSES WHEN STATE
COURTS ARE FACED WITH THE ISSUE OF VIRTUAL LWOP SENTENCES
This Part examines state court responses to Miller and Graham with
regard to virtual LWOP sentences. Outside of California and Iowa, most
state courts have not yet dealt with virtual LWOP sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders. As Part II.A discusses, California and Iowa state
courts have struck down virtual LWOP sentences for homicide offenders,
because they do not provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful
opportunity for release. Part II.B gives an overview of state court decisions
regarding virtual LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenders, including
courts in Florida and Louisiana that have come down on both sides of the
debate. As articulated below, Florida state courts are divided on the issue
of virtual LWOP sentences and what exactly constitutes geriatric release for
juveniles. This has created a question of when exactly a lengthy term-of-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 2472.
Id.
Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2472.
Id. at 2473.
Id.
Id. at 2471.
Id. at 2469.
Id. at 2472–73.
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years sentence becomes LWOP and whether juveniles given these sentences
should be considered LWOP offenders under Graham and Miller.
The absence of any guidance for states as to how to apply Graham and
Miller beyond the narrow confines of the mandatory LWOP sentence has
created conflicting results in state courts and legislatures. Despite the
principle that “‘[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth
Amendment,’”175 state court decisions have created virtual LWOP
sentences that are highly disproportional considering the lower culpability
of juvenile offenders.176
A. California and Iowa Recognize Virtual LWOP Sentences for Juvenile
Homicide Offenders As Unconstitutional Under Miller
Part II.A.1 looks at California’s response to virtual LWOP sentences for
both nonhomicide and homicide offenders. Part II.A.2 describes an Iowa
state case that struck down virtual LWOP sentences under Miller. Both
states recognize that lengthy term-of-years sentences produce the same
results as LWOP and warrant the same concerns as those seen in Miller.
1. California Recognizes Virtual LWOP Sentences for Both Nonhomicide
and Homicide Offenders As Unconstitutional Under Graham and Miller
After the Supreme Court struck down LWOP sentences for nonhomicide
juvenile offenders in Graham, the California Supreme Court was faced with
the question of virtual LWOP sentences in People v. Caballero.177
Caballero was convicted of three counts of attempted murder and was
sentenced to one term of forty years to life and two terms of thirty-five
years to life, to be served consecutively.178 This resulted in a total sentence
of 110 years to life.179 The Court considered whether Graham applied to
Caballero’s de facto LWOP sentence despite the State’s argument that the
sentence was constitutional because “each [sentence] included the
possibility of parole within his lifetime.”180
The California Supreme Court held that despite the State’s narrow
reading of Graham, Caballero’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment
and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.181 The court looked behind
Graham’s categorical ban on LWOP sentences for nonhomicide juvenile
offenders and focused on the rationale that juvenile offenders must be
treated distinctly for sentencing purposes.182 The court found that the
distinct characteristics of juveniles that formed the basis for the Graham

175. Id. at 2463 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010)).
176. See infra Part II.A–B.
177. 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012).
178. Id. at 293.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 294.
181. Id. at 295.
182. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“[B]ecause juveniles have
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”).
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decision supplied an equally important foundation for a categorical ban on
virtual LWOP sentences.183
Specifically, the court focused on Graham’s mandate that juvenile
offenders must be provided a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”184 The Caballero court
concluded that because a virtual LWOP sentence denies such an
opportunity, the categorical ban established in Graham applied to such
sentences.185 Furthermore, the lack of penological justifications for LWOP
sentences for juveniles, as outlined in Graham, applies equally to virtual
LWOP sentences.186 The inability to deter juveniles, the lack of retribution
due to lowered culpability, the high chance for reform that negates
incapacitation, and the incompatibility of LWOP sentences with
rehabilitation all apply with equal force to de facto LWOP sentences.187
After the Caballero decision, California state courts were faced with the
issue of virtual LWOP sentences that were given to juvenile homicide
offenders.188 In People v. Ramirez,189 the California Fourth District Court
of Appeal faced a constitutional challenge to a virtual LWOP sentence
given to a juvenile offender following Miller.190 Both defendants in
Ramirez faced virtual LWOP sentences for first- and second-degree
murder.191 The Ramirez decision applied the Miller holding to de facto
LWOP sentences for homicide offenders using the “juveniles are different”
rationale articulated in Graham and later in Caballero.192 The California
Fourth District Court of Appeals held that discretion and individualized
sentencing are crucial for determining the appropriate punishment for
juvenile offenders, regardless of the offense committed.193
A major factor in the Ramirez decision was the statutory provision
California Penal Code section 1170, enacted by the California legislature
shortly before the case was decided.194 The court stated: “Section 1170,
subdivision (d)(2) provides, in substance, that when a juvenile is sentenced
to LWOP . . . he is entitled to submit a petition for recall of his sentence

183. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 294–95.
184. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
185. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295.
186. Id. at 298 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (“These concerns remain true whether the
sentence is life without parole or a term of years exceeding the offender’s life expectancy.”).
187. Id.
188. See People v. Ramirez, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2013), review granted, 314
P.3d 488 (Cal. 2013); People v. Perez, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114 (Ct. App. 2013).
189. 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128.
190. Id. at 134.
191. Id. at 138. Although Ramirez was originally sentenced to LWOP for the first-degree
murder charge, the court noted that this sentence would have to be reversed in light of
Miller, leaving Ramirez with twenty-five years to life for this count and a total sentence of
ninety-years to life. Id. at 151–52.
192. Id. at 152 (“[S]uch a sentence, which effectively precludes a defendant from ever
being paroled, must still be treated as an LWOP for purposes of analyzing whether it
qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment.”).
193. Id. at 153.
194. Id. at 154–55.
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after he has served at least 15 years.”195 The court viewed the recently
enacted provision as a rejection of lengthy sentences constituting the
equivalent of LWOP for juvenile offenders.196 It stated:
[T]he very fact the Legislature has enacted that statutory provision
suggests it does not endorse the imposition of unduly lengthy sentences
against juvenile offenders, without at least ensuring they are afforded a
meaningful opportunity to seek reconsideration of the sentence within
some reasonable time, based on a demonstration of their positive
character and rehabilitation.197

The court further stated that in enacting section 1170, the California
legislature was granting “parole-type review” to the worst juvenile
offenders—those sentenced to LWOP.198 In doing so, the statute could not
be read to exclude those juvenile offenders who were sentenced to
“theoretically lesser”199 sentences from similar sentencing review based on
remorse, maturity, and rehabilitation.200 Thus, although section 1170 only
applies to LWOP sentences, the court read this to mean that if the worst
juvenile offenders are eligible for release, all juveniles should be given the
same opportunity.201
The Ramirez decision acknowledges that, as articulated in Miller, there
may be a rare juvenile offender who warrants a lifetime in prison.202
However, the court, in light of California’s juvenile-sentencing scheme
under section 1170, held that this determination should be made later in a
juvenile offender’s sentence.203 The court noted that “trial courts are
simply ill-equipped to make reliable lifetime judgments about juvenile
offenders in the immediate wake of their convictions.”204 California took
the mandate from Miller to consider the lesser culpability of juvenile
homicide offenders in sentencing and applied the reasoning to all offenders
regardless of the sentence given.205

195. Id. at 151 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2014)). The
California statute is discussed in depth below in Part III.
196. Id. at 154.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 155.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 154.
203. Id. (“Under our sentencing scheme, the ultimate decision to keep a juvenile offender
in prison for life is a judgment which can be made at a later point, after the juvenile has had
a chance to gain maturity and demonstrate rehabilitation (or not) and both he and the system
have had a chance to gain valuable perspective.”).
204. Id. at 155.
205. Id. at 155–56.
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2. Iowa Supreme Court Strikes Down Lengthy Sentences for Juvenile
Homicide Offenders
The Iowa Supreme Court was faced with a unique response to Miller in
State v. Ragland.206 The defendant under consideration in Ragland was
convicted of first-degree murder for an offense committed when he was
seventeen years old.207 Under a mandatory sentencing scheme in Iowa, the
defendant was given LWOP.208 After the Miller decision came down, the
governor of Iowa commuted the mandated LWOP sentences of thirty-eight
juvenile homicide offenders in Iowa prison at the time, including Ragland,
to life with no possibility for parole for sixty years.209 The defendant in
Ragland appealed the sixty-year sentence, arguing that the commutation
“was unconstitutional because it failed to follow the individualized
considerations mandated by Miller.”210 Assuming that the governor had the
authority to commute Ragland’s sentence, the court then analyzed whether
the sixty-year sentence violated Miller.211
The court first looked to whether the commuted sixty-year term
constituted a mandatory sentence.212 The court determined that the
commuted sentence was mandatory in nature, because it did not take into
account the individual offender but simply changed the length of the
sentence.213 In this regard, the Iowa governor simply substituted one
sentence for another in order to avoid constitutional issues.214 No aspects
of youth or any other factors were taken into account in the governor’s
decision to commute the thirty-eight LWOP sentences.215 The court found,
“Even with the commutation in 2012 by the Governor, Ragland has been
deprived of the constitutional mandate that youths be sentenced pursuant to
the Miller factors.”216 The court held that the Iowa governor could not
circumvent Miller by simply shortening the sentence.217
After concluding the mandatory nature of the commuted sentence, the
Ragland court turned to the issue of de facto LWOP sentences under
Miller.218 The defendant would not be eligible for parole until he reached
the age of seventy-eight.219 Furthermore, “[u]nder standard mortality
tables, his life expectancy [was] 78.6 years.”220 The defendant argued that
206. 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013).
207. Id. at 110.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 110–11.
210. Id. at 112.
211. Id. at 119.
212. Id.
213. Id. (“The commutation by the Governor of Ragland’s sentence to a term of years did
not affect the mandatory nature of the sentence or cure the absence of a process of
individualized sentencing considerations mandated under Miller.”).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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this was the functional equivalent of LWOP.221 The court agreed with
Ragland and noted that “[f]or all practical purposes, the same motivation
behind the mandates of Miller applie[d] to the commuted sentence in this
case or any sentence that is the practical equivalent to life without
parole.”222
Notably, Ragland asserted that “[o]ftentimes, it is important that the
spirit of the law not be lost in the application of the law. This is one such
time.”223 The court held that the same concerns in Miller applied with
equal force to LWOP sentences and de facto LWOP sentences.224 The
Ragland decision asserted that the mandate for individualized sentencing
for juvenile homicide offenders in Miller was aimed at preventing all
juveniles from spending their lives in prison.225
On the same day, the Supreme Court of Iowa also considered State v.
Null,226 a case in which a juvenile homicide offender had received a
cumulative sentence of seventy-five years.227 The defendant argued that
because he was sixteen years old at the time of the offense, and thus, his
first chance for release would occur at age sixty-nine years and four
months, his sentence constituted a de facto LWOP sentence that fell under
the purview of Miller.228 The court held that the rationale of Miller and
Graham included de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders
and mandated that such offenders should be considered in the same way as
those given LWOP.229
As seen in the Ramirez decision, the Iowa court focused on the mandate
from both Graham and Miller that juveniles be granted a “‘meaningful
opportunity to obtain release’” based on lesser culpability and high chance
for behavioral reform.230 Despite the State’s argument that the defendant
would in fact be released from prison during his lifetime, rendering Miller
inapplicable, the Iowa Supreme Court found this to be unavailing.231
Instead, the court looked to what truly constituted a “meaningful
opportunity” for release under Miller.232

221. Id.
222. Id. at 121.
223. Id.
224. Id. (“[T]he rationale of Miller, as well as Graham, reveals that the unconstitutional
imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence is not fixed by substituting it with a
sentence with parole that is the practical equivalent of a life sentence without parole.”).
225. Id. (“[A] government system that resolves disputes could hardly call itself a system
of justice with a rule that demands individualized sentencing considerations common to all
youths apply only to those youths facing a sentence of life without parole and not to those
youths facing a sentence of life with no parole until age seventy-eight.”).
226. 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013).
227. Id. at 45. The defendant would have become parole eligible after fifty-two-and-ahalf years of his sentence at the age of sixty-nine years and four months. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 72.
230. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
231. Id. at 71.
232. Id.
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According to the court’s rationale, Miller and Graham were clearly
aimed at providing juvenile offenders the chance to rehabilitate themselves
given the unique qualities of youth that create such a possibility.233 The
court in Null was highly skeptical that release at the age of sixty-nine years
old escaped the concerns of the Miller Court regarding juveniles spending a
lifetime in prison.234 According to the Null court, “The prospect of geriatric
release . . . does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the
‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter
society.”235 The court also noted that this consideration was further
complicated by life expectancy concerns.236 However, Null stressed that
courts should not embark on an in-depth analysis of the actual life
expectancy of the defendant.237 The principles of Miller and Graham
dictate that most juveniles should be given the opportunity for release
significantly before the end of their lifetime based on a showing of maturity
and reform.238
The Null court stressed that just as with the imposition of a mandatory
LWOP sentence, discretion must be used to consider youth as a mitigating
factor when aggregate term-of-years sentences combine to create virtual
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.239 The court took this
one step further and held that Miller required “more than a generalized
notion of taking age into consideration as a factor in sentencing.”240 Null
directs trial courts to apply a “generally applicable rule” that juveniles are
constitutionally different from adults.241
If the trial court were to determine that a defendant represented a “rare or
uncommon”242 juvenile incapable of reform, there must be more than “a
mere recitation of the nature of the crime.”243 Instead, a court must give an
233. Id.
234. Id. (“Even if lesser sentences than life without parole might be less problematic, we
do not regard the juvenile’s potential future release in his or her late sixties after a half
century of incarceration sufficient to escape the rationales of Graham or Miller.”).
235. Id. (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030).
236. Id. at 72 (noting that a review of standard mortality statistics is required for each
defendant, and “long-term incarceration presents health and safety risks that tend to decrease
life expectancy as compared to the general population”); see also Therese A. Savona, The
Growing Pains of Graham v. Florida: Deciphering Whether Lengthy Term-of-Years
Sentences for Juvenile Defendants Can Equate to the Unconstitutional Sentence of Life
Without the Possibility of Parole, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 182, 209–10 (2013) (“The issue of
where to draw the line on when an individual’s life will end presents a[n] . . . improbable
task. Courts have considered a defendant’s life expectancy under the National Vital
Statistics Report . . . guidelines to determine an individual’s life expectancy ascertained by
one’s age and race. Yet . . . these scientific studies do[] not account for the health,
environment, genetic disposition, as well as geographical and socioeconomic influences that
could lean towards a longer or shorter life span.”).
237. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 75–76.
240. Id. at 74.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 75.
243. Id. at 74–75 (“[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned [that this] cannot overwhelm the
analysis in the context of juvenile sentencing.”).
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in-depth analysis as to why the particular defendant falls outside the general
rule that juveniles are undeserving of spending a lifetime in prison.244 The
Iowa Supreme Court held that lower courts “must recognize that most
juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not destined to become
lifelong criminals.”245 On the contrary, the majority of juveniles should be
given an opportunity for release and sentenced accordingly, regardless of
the nature of their crime.246
B. Florida and Louisiana Decline To Extend
Miller and Graham to Virtual LWOP Sentences
In contrast to the decisions in California and Iowa, state courts in Florida
and Louisiana have held that de facto LWOP sentences do not fall under
Miller and thus do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.247 The
cases discussed below deal with nonhomicide juvenile offenders as opposed
to the homicide offenders in the California and Iowa cases.248 Applying
Miller to both homicide and nonhomicide virtual LWOP has resulted in
outcomes that are not only inconsistent but also raise proportionality issues
under the Eighth Amendment.249 Juvenile nonhomicide offenders are
forced to serve the equivalent of LWOP sentences, while juvenile homicide
offenders are granted the protections under Miller that afford meaningful
opportunity for release. Part II.B.1 discusses a split in Florida state courts
of appeals, and Part II.B.2 gives an overview of Louisiana court decisions
that resulted in disproportional outcomes for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders.
1. Florida District Courts Are Divided on Lengthy
Term-of-Years Sentences Under Graham
Florida state appellate courts are split on virtual LWOP sentences given
to juvenile offenders. The Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeals have
held that, as a matter of law, virtual LWOP sentences do not violate the
Eighth Amendment under Miller or Graham. However, the First District
Court of Appeals has recognized a lengthy term-of-years sentence as the
equivalent of LWOP and struck down that virtual LWOP sentence as
unconstitutional under Graham.
In Henry v. State,250 the Fifth District Court of Appeals declined to
extend the applicability of Graham in cases with virtual LWOP sentences
given to nonhomicide juvenile offenders.251 The defendant had been
sentenced to an aggregate term of ninety years for nonhomicide offenses.252
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
Id.
See infra Part II.B.1–2.
See supra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.2.
82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1086.
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The Henry court recognized the difficulty in adopting any bright-line rule to
prohibit virtual LWOP sentences.253 The court noted that the exact point at
which a lengthy term-of-years sentence becomes the equivalent of LWOP
cannot be determined without drawing some sort of seemingly arbitrary line
based on discretionary judgment calls.254 In Mediate v. State,255 the Fifth
District was presented with a juvenile defendant who had been sentenced to
a cumulative 130 years for kidnapping and four counts of sexual battery.256
The court followed the earlier decision in Henry and upheld the virtual
LWOP sentence.257
Shortly after Mediate, the Fourth District Court of Appeals also refused
to extend Graham to virtual LWOP sentences in the case of juvenile
offenders in Guzman v. State.258 In Guzman, the defendant received a
sixty-year sentence for nonhomicide offenses committed at the age of
fourteen.259 Ultimately, the Fourth District followed the same line of
reasoning that the Fifth District articulated in Mediate.260 Absent any
language in Graham about de facto life sentences, the court found that the
defendant’s sixty-year sentence was constitutional.261 The Guzman court
certified two questions to the Florida Supreme Court: “1. Does Graham v.
Florida apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences that amount to de facto
life sentences? 2. If so, at what point does a term-of-years sentence become
a de facto life sentence?”262 These questions have been certified to the
Florida Supreme Court on several other occasions,263 but the court has yet
to respond or provide lower courts with otherwise meaningful guidance as
to how to apply Graham to de facto LWOP sentences.264
The Guzman court noted that the Florida Court of Appeals districts are
split on this issue.265 Both the Fourth and Fifth Districts have declined to
extend Graham to lengthy term-of-years sentences.266 However, the First
District “has taken different approaches” to the issue of virtual LWOP
253. Id. at 1089 (“At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become
implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, some lesser or greater
number? Would gain time be taken into account? Could the number vary from offender to
offender based on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the number of
crimes matter?”).
254. Id.
255. 108 So. 3d 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
256. Id. at 704–05.
257. Id. at 706–07.
258. 110 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
259. Id. at 481 (“Because we believe that the express holding of Graham established a
bright-line and all-encompassing prohibition on actual life sentences without the possibility
of parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenses, we hold that Guzman’s sixty-year sentence was
not unconstitutional . . . .”).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 483.
262. Id. (citation omitted).
263. See Rosario v. State, 122 So. 3d 412, 415–16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Taylor v.
State, 117 So. 3d 844, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
264. Review was granted in Gridine v. State, 103 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 2012), but the Florida
Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue.
265. Guzman, 110 So. 3d at 482–83.
266. Id. at 482.
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sentences under Graham.267 In Thomas v. State,268 the court held that a
fifty-year sentence given to a seventeen-year-old for nonhomicide offenses
was constitutional.269 The court stated, “While we agree that at some point,
a term-of-years sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life
sentence, we do not believe that situation has occurred in the instant
case.”270
In Gridine v. State,271 the First District echoed the Thomas opinion and
held that although a term-of-years sentence will at some point become the
equivalent of an LWOP sentence, a seventy-year sentence given to a
fourteen-year-old offender did not create that situation.272 This seems to be
in direct contrast with the Iowa Supreme Court’s interpretation of Graham
and Miller, which deemed geriatric release as violating Graham’s mandate
to provide meaningful release to juvenile offenders in Null.273
However, Judge Wolf’s dissenting opinion in Gridine argued that the
appellant would spend the rest of his life in prison, thus violating “the spirit,
if not the letter, of the Graham decision.”274 Judge Wolf’s dissent appeared
to follow the rationale of the Iowa and California cases that extended Miller
to de facto LWOP sentences.275 Nevertheless, Judge Wolf also noted that
absent any statutory provisions on juvenile parole from the Florida
legislature, the Florida Supreme Court would have to guidance to the lower
courts on how to apply Graham in the larger context of lengthy
sentences.276
One year later, the First District Court of Appeals changed its tune. In
Floyd v. State,277 the defendant was sentenced to eighty years in prison on
two counts of armed robbery committed at the age of seventeen.278 The
court addressed the prior cases that upheld similar sentences as
constitutional but disagreed with the holding that “a lengthy term-of-years
sentence cannot constitute the functional equivalent of a life sentence
without parole.”279 In Floyd, the defendant would not have been released
until he was ninety-seven years old, ensuring a lifetime in prison.280 The
court determined that by sentencing the defendant to eighty years in prison,
the trial court had foreclosed any possibility that the defendant would
eventually be refit to enter society.281 The First District held that this

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
78 So. 3d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 646.
89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 103 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 2012).
Id. at 911.
See supra Part II.A.
Gridine, 89 So. 3d at 911 (Wolf, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also supra Part II.A.
Gridine, 89 So. 3d at 911.
87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45–46.
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violated Graham and was therefore unconstitutional, seemingly reaching
the point at which a lengthy sentence became the equivalent of LWOP.282
The division among the Florida State District Courts of Appeals is further
complicated by the manner in which certain districts have dealt with LWOP
sentences under Miller. In Horsley v. State,283 the Fifth District Court of
Appeals struck down an LWOP sentence given to a defendant convicted of
a first-degree murder that he committed at the age of seventeen.284 In doing
so, the court held that Florida statute section 775.082 was unconstitutional
under Miller.285 Section 775.082 stated that the only available sentences
for capital murder are mandatory LWOP and capital punishment.286 The
court noted that although other district courts of appeals in Florida had
recognized the problem with section 775.082 after Miller, “none of them
[had] given definitive direction to trial courts regarding the available
sentencing alternatives after Miller.”287
Horsley held that through statutory revival, courts should sentence
juvenile homicide offenders to life with the possibility of parole after
twenty-five years.288 The 1993 version of Florida Statutes section
775.082(1) included such a provision.289 This concept was first articulated
in a concurring opinion from the First District regarding a juvenile
homicide offender sentenced to LWOP.290 The Horsley court noted that the
judiciary was left with no current statutory alternatives after Miller had
rendered section 775.082 unconstitutional291:
[T]he judiciary’s role in a case like this—where a legislative enactment is
declared unconstitutional and the alternative of having no option to
address the subject would be untenable—is largely guided by the doctrine
of separation of powers. In other words, the judiciary is attempting to fill
a statutory gap while remaining as faithful as possible to expressed
legislative intent, but also attempting to avoid judicial intermeddling by
crafting our own statute to address the issue with original language.292

Thus, Horsley held that the 1993 version of section 775.082 must be
revived.293 By adopting this ruling, the court was avoiding any attempt to

282. Id. at 46 (“While the trial court was correct that the Eighth Amendment does not
foreclose the possibility that juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes will remain in
prison for life, Graham also cautioned that states are foreclosed from making the judgment
at the outset that those offenders will never be fit to reenter society.”).
283. 121 So. 3d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review granted, Nos. SC13-1938, SC132000, 2013 WL 6224657 (Fla. Nov. 14, 2013).
284. Id. at 1131.
285. Id.
286. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West Supp. 2013).
287. Horsley, 121 So. 3d at 1131.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1132.
290. Partlow v. State, No. 1D10–5896, 2013 WL 45743, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
2013) (Makar, J., concurring).
291. Horsley, 121 So. 3d at 1132.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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rewrite section 775.082 in original language, a decision that would likely be
considered legislating from the bench.294
The court further stated, “We also strongly believe that many of the
considerations outlined in Miller would be far better addressed years after
sentencing in a parole-type setting, once the juvenile has matured into an
adult and his or her conduct during decades of confinement has been
evaluated.”295 This statement seems puzzling in light of decisions like
Mediate in the Fifth District that declined to extend parole eligibility to
juvenile nonhomicide offenders given virtual LWOP sentences.296 Thus,
the Fifth District has advocated for a revival of a statute that would ensure
parole eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders after twenty-five years but
has upheld virtual LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenders. The
division among Florida courts regarding parole eligibility under Miller and
Graham has created occasions in which juvenile homicide offenders are
given parole opportunities after serving twenty-five years of their sentence,
but nonhomicide offenders must serve sixty years or more without any hope
of release.
2. Louisiana Declines To Extend Graham
to Lengthy Term-of-Years Sentences
In State v. Brown,297 the Supreme Court of Louisiana also invoked a
narrow reading of Graham’s holding.298 In Brown, the defendant was
convicted of aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery.299 The defendant
received an LWOP sentence for the aggravated kidnapping charge and four
consecutive ten-year sentences for the armed robbery charges.300 The court
evaluated a forty-year sentence with no parole eligibility as a virtual LWOP
sentence that the defendant challenged under Graham’s holding.301
The district court overturned both the LWOP sentence and the forty-year
cumulative sentence under Graham.302 The intermediate court reversed the
decision only with regard to the armed robbery sentences, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the
consecutive sentences were permissible under Graham.303 In this case,
based on the State’s calculations, the defendant would receive a sentence of
seventy years and would be eligible for parole at age eighty-six.304
294. Id. (“The advantage of relying upon the doctrine of statutory revival is that we
simply revert to a solution that was duly adopted by the legislature itself.”).
295. Id.
296. See supra Part II.B.1.
297. 118 So. 3d 332 (La. 2013).
298. Id. at 332.
299. Id. at 333–34.
300. Id. at 334.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 334–35.
304. Id. at 335 (“According to our calculations, if we accept the State’s argument that the
original armed robbery sentences should be reinstated, defendant will be eligible for parole
on the life sentence after serving 30 years . . . at approximately age 46, but will not be
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As explained in Brown, the Louisiana state legislature had amended its
sentencing laws to comply with Graham.305 Section 15:574.4(D)(1) of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes states that any juvenile offender serving a life
sentence may be eligible for parole after serving thirty years.306 However,
the court noted that the revised statutes did not cover the issue at hand and
thus provided no parole requirements for lengthy term-of-years
sentences.307
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that absent any clear direction from
the U.S. Supreme Court on de facto LWOP sentences, “state courts are left
to grapple with sentences such as the one possibly at issue here, i.e., a term
of years that may exceed the life span of the defendant.”308 The Brown
decision focused on the limited holding of Graham and the absence of any
application outside of LWOP sentences: “[W]e see nothing in Graham that
even applies to sentences for multiple convictions, as Graham conducted no
analysis of sentences for multiple convictions and provides no guidance on
how to handle such sentences.”309
Based on the lack of guidance in Graham, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the lower court’s decision to remove the parole eligibility
restrictions on the four consecutive ten-year sentences.310 The court also
cited Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham, which had declined to extend the
rationale behind prohibiting LWOP sentences to lengthy term-of-years
sentences.311 The Brown decision created a situation in which a juvenile
offender sentenced to LWOP will be eligible for parole earlier, after thirty
years in this particular case, than a juvenile offender sentenced to a term-ofyears constituting virtual LWOP.
This conflict is further evident when considering the multiple cases in
Louisiana that have remanded LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders.312 On at least three separate occasions, Louisiana courts have
overturned LWOP sentences given to juvenile offenders convicted of
second-degree murder based on the absence of the consideration of the
mitigating factors described in Miller in the sentencing courts’ decisions.313
The courts “grant[ed] remand . . . to reconsider the sentence after
entitled to release . . . because his armed robbery sentences would run consecutively to the
life sentence . . . thus, he would not be subject to release until possibly age 86.”).
305. Id. at 340; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4 (Supp. 2014).
306. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4. In order to become parole eligible, juvenile
offenders must also meet a list of criteria including “mandatory minimum of one hundred
hours of prerelease programming,” substance abuse treatment, and a General Equivalency
Degree certificate or an equivalent. Id. § 15:574.4(D)(1)(a)–(e).
307. Brown, 118 So. 3d at 341.
308. Id. at 336.
309. Id. at 341.
310. Id. at 342.
311. Id. at 336 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2058 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting)).
312. See State v. Williams, 108 So. 3d 1169 (La. 2013) (per curiam); State ex rel. Landry
v. State, 106 So. 3d 106 (La. 2013) (per curiam); State v. Fletcher, 112 So. 3d 1031 (La. Ct.
App. 2013).
313. Williams, 108 So. 3d at 1169; State ex rel. Landry, 106 So. 3d at 106–07; Fletcher,
112 So. 3d at 1037.
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conducting a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the principles
enunciated in Miller v. Alabama.”314 Yet, a juvenile nonhomicide offender
subject to a lengthy sentence was not granted the same remand of his
sentence so that a sentencing court could consider his individual
characteristics and qualities of youth.315
Ultimately, these holdings have led to outcomes in which juvenile
homicide offenders may be eligible for parole far before juvenile
nonhomicide offenders who are sentenced to lengthy term-of-years
sentences that result in the equivalent of LWOP.316 The juvenile offenders
in Mediate, Henry, and Guzman are, at the time of publishing, serving
lengthy sentences constituting virtual LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.317
Yet homicide juvenile offenders serving de facto LWOP sentences were
granted reprieve in California and Iowa state courts under Miller.318
III. CALIFORNIA DIRECTLY ADDRESSES VIRTUAL LWOP SENTENCES,
WHILE LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN OTHER STATES FAILS TO ADEQUATELY
ENACT COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE SENTENCING REFORM
As several authors have noted, the issue of virtual LWOP sentences
under Graham creates constitutional questions and likely invites arbitrary
line drawing as to how long a sentence must be to trigger constitutional
protections against LWOP under Graham and Miller.319 This Note
proposes that the only adequate manner in which states can address both
LWOP and virtual LWOP given to all juvenile offenders is through
statutory provisions that remove parole restrictions from juvenile offenders.
Several states have taken actions toward compliance with Miller and
Graham by enacting statutory revisions that provide an opportunity for
resentencing and parole for those juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP or
life imprisonment.320 These statutes set forth certain requirements that
must be met for inmates who were sentenced to LWOP for crimes
committed as juveniles to become eligible for resentencing and possibly
parole.321 As Part III outlines, states including Louisiana and Wyoming
have enacted this type of legislation, although the states vary on how many

314. Wiliams, 108 So. 3d at 1169.
315. See generally State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332 (La. 2013).
316. See supra Part II.
317. See supra Part II.
318. See supra Part II.
319. Schlessel, supra note 9, at 1054 (“[E]xtending Graham to term-of-years sentences
would generate a multitude of line-drawing problems. Undeniably, holding Graham
applicable to lengthy term-of-years sentences would trigger significant questions. For
example, at what point does a term-of-years sentence become unconstitutional?”); see also
Freeman, supra note 111, at 983 (“[S]entencing law is notoriously complicated and
legislatures tend to grant sentencing judges a healthy amount of discretion. Unfortunately,
this means that some prosecutors and judges might pursue sentences that are just short of an
unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentence.”).
320. See infra Part III.A.
321. See infra Part III.A.
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years of an LWOP sentence an offender must serve before he or she
becomes eligible for reconsideration.322
Unfortunately, these statutes do not apply to offenders outside of those
who were explicitly sentenced to LWOP or life imprisonment.323 Thus,
although the statutory revisions discussed below are in compliance with
Miller and Graham, they do not adequately address the issue of lengthy
term-of-years sentences that constitute virtual LWOP. However, as
explained in Part III.B, other states, including Montana, already had
statutory provisions in place that remove parole restrictions from any
sentence given to a juvenile offender before the Miller decision. This type
of law ensures that juveniles will at least be eligible for release and that a
sentencing court can make the determination at a later point as to whether a
juvenile falls among the limited number of offenders who deserve life in
prison.324
Removing parole restrictions for all juvenile offenders,
regardless of the offense committed or the sentence given, may be the only
viable method of confronting the issue of virtual LWOP sentences. Part
III.B also discusses the comprehensive juvenile sentencing reform in
California that directly takes into account virtual LWOP sentences after
Caballero.
A. Louisiana and Wyoming Respond to Graham and Miller
Through Statutory Reform Providing Juveniles
Sentenced to LWOP with Some Hope for Release
Part III.A.1 provides an overview of Louisiana’s sentencing reform postMiller and explains why the state’s statute that pertains to juvenile homicide
offenders may be inadequate to provide opportunities for parole. Part
III.A.2 discusses a similar Wyoming statute enacted to provide the potential
for parole for all juvenile offenders, regardless of the offense. The
Wyoming statute also only applies to juvenile LWOP offenders, and while
it represents a comprehensive response to Miller, it does not address the
issues posed by virtual LWOP.
1. Louisiana Provides Parole Eligibility for
Homicide Offenders Only Prior to Sentencing
The Louisiana State Senate eliminated parole restrictions on life
sentences for juvenile offenders who committed nonhomicide offenses.325
Under section 15:574.4 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, any juvenile
offender serving a life sentence for a nonhomicide offense is eligible for
parole after serving thirty years of his or her sentence.326 To qualify for
parole eligibility, a three-person panel must consider the offender.327 This
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(D) (2014).
See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(D)(2).
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panel is provided with a written evaluation from an “expert[] in adolescent
brain development.”328
Recent statutory revisions in Louisiana also include a provision that
provides parole eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders convicted of
first- or second-degree murder.329 Offenders that have served thirty-five
years of their life sentence may be entitled to parole “if a judicial
determination has been made that the person is entitled to parole eligibility
pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 878.1.”330 Article 878.1
mandates that any juvenile convicted of first- or second-degree murder must
be subject to a hearing prior to sentencing to determine parole eligibility on
a sentence of life imprisonment.331 Juvenile offenders may present
mitigating factors332 to establish if they qualify for parole eligibility.333
The statute parrots the Miller decision in mandating that “[s]entences
imposed without parole eligibility should normally be reserved for the
worst offenders and the worst cases.”334
Although Louisiana provides juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to
life imprisonment with some chance for release, this opportunity only arises
before sentencing, pursuant to article 878.1.335 As outlined above,
sentencing courts are likely not well equipped to make decisions about a
juvenile’s potential for reform at this early stage.336 Miller did not rule out
the possibility that some juveniles may fall into the category of offenders
meriting a lifetime in prison; however, the spirit of both Miller and Graham
suggest that this determination should be made later, after the mitigating
characteristics of youth can no longer account for criminal behavior.337
Furthermore, section 15.574.4 only applies to life sentences and does not
address any juveniles, such as the defendant in Brown,338 who may have
been sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences, which can potentially
span much longer than thirty-five years with no parole eligibility until the
end of the sentence. In this regard, Louisiana has not provided a solution to
the virtual LWOP sentences problem.

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
Miller:
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
Id. § 15:574.4(E)(1).
Id.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(A) (Supp. 2014).
Id. art. 878.1(B) (mitigating factors outlined in § 878.1 include those discussed in
“the offender’s level of family support [and] social history”).
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 878.1(A).
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.2.

3472

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

2. Wyoming Allows Juveniles an Opportunity for Parole
After Twenty-Five Years Served Regardless of the Offense
Wyoming also enacted sentencing reform after the Supreme Court’s ban
on mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences from Miller.339 In 2013, the
Wyoming State legislature amended several statutory provisions through
House Bill 23 (H.B. 23), effectively eliminating juvenile LWOP.340 Prior
to H.B. 23, section 6-2-101 of the Wyoming Statutes mandated a sentence of
LWOP for first-degree murder.341 Through H.B. 23, section 6-2-101 was
amended to include an exception for juvenile offenders convicted of firstdegree murder for whom the statutory punishment is now a sentence of life
imprisonment.342 H.B. 23 also amended section 6-10-301, the Wyoming
statute that previously prohibited parole for offenders serving LWOP or life
imprisonment unless the governor commuted the sentence to a term of
years.343
A juvenile offender is now eligible for parole after serving twenty-five
years of their sentence regardless of the offense committed under section 610-301.344 The only exceptions outlined in section 6-10-301 are for those
offenders who assaulted any employee of a correctional institution with a
deadly weapon or who attempted to escape from incarceration while serving
their sentence.345 This statutory provision seems to follow the logic
articulated in Miller that nothing the Supreme Court said in Graham
regarding juvenile culpability is “crime specific.”346
In contrast to the similar legislation in Louisiana, no specific factors or
requirements are listed in section 6-10-301 for a juvenile to be considered
eligible for parole in front of a sentencing or parole board.347 This may
prove to be a lower bar for juvenile offenders when petitioning a parole
board for release. On the other hand, the parole board may simply be
allotted more discretion in making its determination about the eligibility of
the offender. In either case, section 6-10-301 only applies to juvenile
339. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c) (2013).
340. H.B. 23, 62nd Leg., 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013), available at
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Enroll/HB0023.pdf (“An Act relating to crimes and
offenses; modifying provisions relating to life sentences for juvenile offenders generally;
eliminating life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders; and providing for an
effective date.”).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. (“A person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before the
person reached the age of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for parole after commutation
of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of
incarceration.”).
345. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-402(b) (2013) (stating that those juvenile offenders who,
while serving their sentence, after the age of eighteen either: “(i) Made an assault with a
deadly weapon upon any officer, employee or inmate of any institution; or (ii) Escaped,
attempted to escape or assisted others to escape from any institution” are not considered
eligible for parole after twenty-five years).
346. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
347. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c).
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offenders sentenced to life imprisonment and, like the Louisiana statutes,
does not adequately address virtual LWOP.
B. Statutory Schemes in Montana and California May Present
Potential Solutions to Virtual LWOP Sentences
Part III.B.1 looks at a Montana state law enacted prior to Graham and
Miller that may present a potential solution to the issue of virtual LWOP
sentences not seen in statutory responses post Miller. The Montana statute
removes parole restrictions for all juvenile offenders. Part III.B.2 discusses
California Penal Code section 1170, mentioned above in Part II, in detail
and the multiple opportunities juvenile offenders may have for resentencing
and parole. Part III.B.2 also looks at Senate Bill 260 in California, recently
signed into law in September 2013. Senate Bill 260 directly addresses the
issue of virtual LWOP and represents the only comprehensive statutory
reform specifically aimed at resolving issues posed by lengthy term-ofyears sentences given to both homicide and nonhomicide juvenile
offenders.
1. The Montana Statute May Present a Solution to the
Issue of Virtual LWOP Sentences for All Juvenile Offenders
Montana’s Code of Criminal Procedure provides an opportunity for
release for all juvenile offenders regardless of the crime or the nature of the
sentence imposed.348 Although this statutory provision was not enacted in
response to Graham or Miller, Montana’s treatment of juvenile offenders
addresses both the issue of homicide versus nonhomicide offenders and de
facto LWOP sentences. Section 46-18-222 of the Montana Code provides
an exception to mandatory life sentences for offenders who committed
offenses while under the age of eighteen.349 This exception applies to all
juvenile offenders, regardless of the offense committed.350 This statute
does not differentiate between nonhomicide and homicide juvenile
offenders.351 Furthermore, section 46-18-222 removes the “restrictions on
parole eligibility” for all juvenile offenders.352 Thus, a juvenile sentenced
to a lengthy term-of-years sentence constituting the equivalent of LWOP
would be eligible for parole under this statute.
This would directly impact offenders such as the defendant in State v.
Brown, who was faced with a forty-year sentence with no parole despite
Miller’s mandate that all juveniles receive an opportunity for release.353
Courts would not be able to circumvent Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP
348. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (West Supp. 2013).
349. Id. (“Mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state, mandatory
life sentences . . . and restrictions on parole eligibility . . . do not apply if: (1) the offender
was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the
offender is to be sentenced . . . .”).
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. See supra Part II.B.2.
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sentences by upholding lengthy term-of-years sentences that ensure a
lifetime in prison for juvenile offenders under a statutory provision such as
that enacted in Montana. The Montana statute still leaves open the
possibility that the rare juvenile homicide offender who shows no capability
of reform will spend the remainder of his or her life in prison. The
availability of parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted. To
ensure that the worst offenders are not guaranteed parole, requirements such
as those seen in California Penal Code section 1170 could be listed in a
juvenile parole statute to implement the Miller holding.354 However, these
requirements pose problems for those juveniles who may be deserving of
resentencing or even release but are unable to demonstrate that they meet
the extensive list of requirements.
2. California Gives Juvenile LWOP Offenders
Multiple Chances for Resentencing and Enacts
Comprehensive Reform To Address Virtual LWOP
California enacted comprehensive juvenile sentencing reforms in
response to Miller and Graham. The California State legislature passed the
“Fair Sentencing for Youth Act” in September of 2012 in the wake of the
Miller decision.355 As a response to Miller’s mandate to provide juveniles
with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,”356 the Fair Sentencing
for Youth Act gives all juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences multiple
opportunities for parole eligibility.357 Juvenile defendants may petition for
a recall of an LWOP sentence after serving fifteen years.358 The offender
may be either resentenced or granted parole.359 If, after the sentencing
court has considered the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the
offender is not recalled for resentencing, the defendant may repetition for
review after serving twenty, twenty-four, and twenty-five years of an
LWOP sentence.360 As evidenced by the California Senate’s legislative
history for section 1170, this sentencing scheme in California also follows
the insistence of the Miller Court that the logic of Graham apply to all
juvenile offenders, regardless of the crime committed.361 Thus, juvenile
homicide offenders are given the same opportunities to reform as those
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.

354. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(F) (West Supp. 2014).
355. S.B. 9, 2012 Leg. (Ca. 2012), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB9 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West
2013)).
356. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
357. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2).
358. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i).
359. Id.
360. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(H).
361. See SENATE FLOOR REP. ON S.B. 9, S.B. 9, 2011–2012 Sess., at 11 (Ca. 2012),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_9_cfa_2012
0817_125307_sen_floor.html (“While [juvenile offenders] should be held accountable for
their actions, even those who commit serious crimes should have the opportunity to prove
they have matured and changed.”).
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Although section 1170 seems to take large steps toward incorporating
Miller’s holding into state law, the statute “hardly throws open the prison
doors for all violent offenders.”362 Prisoners who were convicted of
offenses committed as juveniles must meet several criteria demonstrating
remorse and rehabilitation.363 Even after this consideration, resentencing is
entirely at the discretion of the sentencing court.364 In fact, proponents of
the California statute concede that those juveniles eligible for resentencing
after years in prison are likely small in number.365 Furthermore, juvenile
offenders subject to resentencing are not ensured parole.366 In reality,
section 1170 “will probably only benefit a small percentage of inmates,
those whose crimes were so grave that they were given LWOP sentences,
but whose actions were more the result of adolescent delinquency rather
than inherent evil.”367 However, Miller did not foreclose the possibility
that LWOP may be an appropriate sentence for some juvenile homicide
offenders who are beyond reform.368 Thus, section 1170 complies with
Miller in providing juvenile offenders the opportunity for parole but may
not actually be effective in providing any meaningful chance at
rehabilitation and release for the majority of juvenile LWOP offenders.
As seen with both the Louisiana and Wyoming statutes, section 1170
only applies to those juveniles sentenced to LWOP.369 Under all three
statutory schemes, a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to LWOP or life
imprisonment will be provided opportunities for parole at various stages in
his sentence. However, potential exists that a juvenile offender convicted
of either nonhomicide or homicide offenses, who is sentenced to a lengthy
term-of-years sentence, will not be eligible for parole. This is especially
true in states like Louisiana where courts have upheld virtual LWOP
sentences as outside the scope of Graham and Miller and thus have upheld
parole restrictions, ensuring that the offender spends the majority or entirety
of his or her life in prison.370
362. Roman Edwards, Getting a Break from Forever: Chapter 828 Provides an
Opportunity for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole To Get Their Lives Back, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 744, 757 (2013).
363. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(F)(iv)–(viii). Some factors that the Court may
consider include: “[T]he defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had
suffered from psychological or physical trauma, or significant stress . . . . The defendant has
performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation,
including, but not limited to, availing himself or herself of rehabilitative, educational, or
vocational programs . . . . The defendant has maintained family ties or connections with
others . . . . The defendant has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the last
five years in which the defendant was determined to be the aggressor.” Id.
364. Edwards, supra note 362, at 757.
365. Id. at 758 (“[The] authors concede that because juvenile offenders enter the prison
system at such a young and impressionable age, it is unlikely many will develop the
interpersonal and communication skills necessary to be successful in the rigorous
resentencing process.”).
366. Id. at 757–58.
367. Id. at 761.
368. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
369. The Louisiana and Wyoming statutes are applicable to juvenile offenders with
sentences of life imprisonment. See supra Part III.A.
370. See supra Part II.A.2.
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The California State legislature has continued to enact sentencing reform
that responds directly not only to Miller but also to People v. Caballero and
the issue of de facto LWOP sentences given to juvenile offenders. In
September 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 260
(S.B. 260),371 which addresses juvenile offenders given lengthy sentences
outside of LWOP. S.B. 260 “requires the state parole board to consider
releasing juvenile offenders who have served at least 15 years of a long
sentence.”372 S.B. 260 creates “youth offender parole hearing[s]” for any
juvenile offender given a lengthy prison sentence.373 Furthermore, S.B. 260
directly codifies the central holdings of Miller and Graham by mandating
that youth offender parole boards “shall provide for a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release.”374 Parole boards considering offenders who
were convicted as juveniles are instructed to take growth, maturity, and “the
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults” into account.375
S.B. 260 added section 3051 to the California Penal Code, creating
provisions for youth offender parole hearings.376 Under the provisions of
section 3051, any juvenile offender who is still incarcerated after serving
fifteen years of his or her “determinate” or term-of-years sentence becomes
parole eligible.377 A juvenile offender sentenced to a life term of less than
twenty-five years to life becomes eligible for parole before a youth offender
parole hearing during his of her twentieth year of incarceration.378 Finally,
a juvenile offender given a life sentence of twenty-five years to life is
eligible for parole during his or her twenty-fifth year of that sentence.379
Section 1 of S.B. 260 describes the legislative intent behind the bill:
The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that
provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed
as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown
that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance
with the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero
and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Graham v.
Florida and Miller v. Alabama.380

The mention of People v. Caballero seems to indicate that the legislature
was directly addressing the issue of virtual LWOP sentences after the
California Supreme Court held that virtual LWOP must be considered in the

371. S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2013), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_02510300/sb_260_bill_20130916_
chaptered.pdf.
372. Jesse Wegman, Once Again, California Eases Harsh Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/once-againcalifornia-eases-harsh-sentencing-laws/?_r=0.
373. S.B. 260 § 4 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (West Supp. 2014)).
374. Id.
375. Id. § 5 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c)).
376. Id. § 4.
377. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(b)(1).
378. Id. § 3051(b)(2).
379. Id. § 3051(b)(3).
380. S.B. 260 § 1 (citations omitted).
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same manner as LWOP under Graham.381 Section 1 further mentions
Miller and thus incorporates the Caballero rationale to extend to all juvenile
offenders, including those convicted of homicide.382 Juveniles convicted of
LWOP are exempt from S.B. 260, further indicating that the bill was aimed
at comprehensive sentencing reform that takes virtual LWOP into
account.383
The California legislature takes sentencing reform a step further in S.B.
260 and sets up early mechanisms for inmates that further promote
rehabilitation and a “meaningful opportunity for release.”384 Section 2 of
S.B. 260 amends California Penal Code section 3041 and mandates that the
Board of Parole Hearings meet with inmates six years prior to the minimum
date of parole eligibility.385 These meetings are conducted for the
“purposes of reviewing and documenting the inmate’s activities and
conduct pertinent to both parole eligibility and to the granting or
withholding of post conviction credit.”386 The Board is required to inform
the inmate of the details of the parole hearing process and of specific
information regarding the individual’s suitability for parole.387 Section
3041 thus follows the mandate to provide a meaningful opportunity to
release, as articulated in Miller and its progeny. Juvenile offenders will be
informed early in their sentences about the requirements for parole and how
to meet them.388 The board considers such factors as “work assignments,
rehabilitative programs, and institutional behavior.”389
Finally, S.B. 260 created California Penal Code section 4801(c), which
gives guidance to the Board of Parole Hearings on the manner in which
youth should be taken into account in the parole context.390 The newly
amended section 4801(c) instructs the board to “give great weight to the
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”391 S.B. 260 represents a
comprehensive effort on the part of the California State legislature to
address the issues created by virtual LWOP sentences, as seen initially in
Caballero with juvenile nonhomicide offenders. The new parole system
created for juvenile inmates with lengthy sentences further incorporates
juvenile homicide offenders with virtual LWOP sentences, such as the
defendant in Ramirez. S.B. 260 gives parole boards until July 1, 2015, to

381. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012).
382. S.B. 260 § 1.
383. Id. § 4(h) (“This section shall not apply to cases in which . . . an individual was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.”).
384. Id. §§ 1, 4.
385. Id. § 2.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(a) (West Supp. 2014).
389. Id.
390. S.B. § 5.
391. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c).
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comply with the statutory revisions and complete parole hearings to those
offenders eligible for parole consideration under S.B. 260.392
Opponents of statutory reform like S.B. 260 may argue that this type of
sentencing reform goes too far in ensuring release for what potentially may
be the worst violent juvenile offenders. Specifically, opponents have noted
that eliminating parole restrictions for all juvenile offenders likely places an
undue burden on the families of the victims, especially with regard to
juvenile homicide offenders.393 Statutory schemes that provide for multiple
opportunities for inmates to be considered for parole may force families of
victims or, in some cases of severe nonhomicide crimes, the victims
themselves, to relive the experience over and over again. This is likely
especially true if states are to enact statutory reform similar to that in
California, where juvenile offenders have multiple opportunities to obtain
parole during lengthy sentences.
Although these concerns about the practical implications of statutory
reform such as S.B. 260 or statutes similar to section 46-18-222 of
Montana’s Code of Criminal Procedure are certainly valid, removing
restrictions on parole eligibility for juvenile offenders may be the only valid
way to avoid arbitrary line-drawing problems that apply to virtual LWOP.
Furthermore, statutes like S.B. 260 ensure that juvenile nonhomicide
offenders will not be left serving more time than juvenile homicide
offenders because of a virtual LWOP sentence. By providing inmates who
were convicted as juveniles with multiple opportunities at various stages of
their lengthy sentences, a sentencing court or a parole board will not be
asked to determine exactly at what point a lengthy term-of-years sentence
becomes LWOP. Instead, juvenile offenders are given equal opportunity
for reform and the parole board must determine whether or not each
offender represents the rare juvenile homicide offender who may be beyond
reform and must spend the remainder of his or her life in prison.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, virtual LWOP sentences given to juvenile offenders pose the
same issues considered with mandatory LWOP sentences in Miller. By
refusing to extend the holdings of Miller and Graham to virtual LWOP,
state courts have created situations in which juveniles convicted of
homicide may be eligible for parole before nonhomicide juvenile offenders
in the same state. State legislatures should take this problem into account
when drafting statutory revisions to comply with Miller and Graham. If
392. Id. § 3051(i).
393. Florida Struggles To Craft Juvenile Sentencing Policy, CBS MIAMI (Oct. 16,
2013, 10:16 AM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/10/16/florida-struggles-to-craft-juvenilesentencing-policy (discussing concerns over victims’ families reliving crimes through the
endless hearings associated with parole); see also Peggy Senzarino, Teens Sentenced to Life
in Limbo; Families Need Closure, GLOBE GAZETTE (Dec. 8, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://globegazette.com/news/local/teens-sentenced-to-life-in-limbo-families-need-closure/
article_d3b68477-12e7-5310-a2ca-87e15e18b9d4.html (noting that parole hearings and
resentencing create an “endless run of hearings and court appearances [that] is disturbing to
the families”).
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virtual LWOP sentences are not incorporated into sentencing laws, state
courts may have to embark on some sort of arbitrary determination as to
how long a sentence must be in order to constitute virtual LWOP. This
would inevitably include some life expectancy calculations, which, as
articulated above, are likely impossible based on demographic factors and
on the effect that prison may have on life span. To avoid this potentially
problematic analysis, states can include provisions that provide for parole at
certain stages of lengthy sentences regardless of the offense committed or
the sentence imposed.
Statutory reform that deals directly with juveniles sentenced to LWOP or
life imprisonment, such as that enacted in Louisiana and Wyoming, does
not adequately address the constitutional questions that arise with juvenile
offenders sentenced to virtual LWOP. In order to avoid circumstances in
which a juvenile nonhomicide offender sentenced to LWOP is eligible for
parole later than a juvenile homicide offender given a sentence of LWOP or
life, states must either remove all parole restrictions on juvenile offenders or
create opportunities for parole for lengthy term-of-years sentences.
Following either the reforms of the California State legislature or the
Montana statute that ensures parole eligibility for all juveniles, states will
likely be able to avoid any constitutional issues surrounding juveniles given
virtual LWOP sentences.

